mirror of
https://github.com/ClusterCockpit/cc-metric-store.git
synced 2026-07-14 21:50:39 +02:00
moebiusband
153ecb6dff
The per-handler JWT validation cache was never pruned, so a long-running process accumulated one map entry per distinct rotating token, growing without bound (a slow memory leak / DoS vector). Evict stale entries on the cache-miss path and cap the cache at maxTokenCacheSize, clearing it if eviction of expired tokens cannot free space. Also document in the README that auth verifies only the token signature and expiry (claims/roles are not enforced) and that an empty jwt-public-key disables authentication entirely. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
88 lines
2.4 KiB
Go
88 lines
2.4 KiB
Go
// Copyright (C) NHR@FAU, University Erlangen-Nuremberg.
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// All rights reserved. This file is part of cc-metric-store.
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// Use of this source code is governed by a MIT-style
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// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
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package api
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import (
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"crypto/ed25519"
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"errors"
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"net/http"
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"strings"
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"sync"
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"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v4"
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)
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// maxTokenCacheSize bounds the number of validated tokens kept in memory.
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// Reaching it triggers eviction of expired entries (see authHandler).
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const maxTokenCacheSize = 1024
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func authHandler(next http.Handler, publicKey ed25519.PublicKey) http.Handler {
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cacheLock := sync.RWMutex{}
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cache := map[string]*jwt.Token{}
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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authheader := r.Header.Get("Authorization")
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if authheader == "" || !strings.HasPrefix(authheader, "Bearer ") {
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http.Error(rw, "Use JWT Authentication", http.StatusUnauthorized)
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return
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}
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rawtoken := authheader[len("Bearer "):]
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cacheLock.RLock()
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token, ok := cache[rawtoken]
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cacheLock.RUnlock()
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if ok && token.Claims.Valid() == nil {
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next.ServeHTTP(rw, r)
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return
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}
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if ok {
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// Cached token has since expired (or become otherwise invalid);
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// drop it so the cache does not accumulate stale entries.
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cacheLock.Lock()
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delete(cache, rawtoken)
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cacheLock.Unlock()
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}
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// The actual token is ignored for now.
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// In case expiration and so on are specified, the Parse function
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// already returns an error for expired tokens.
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var err error
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token, err = jwt.Parse(rawtoken, func(t *jwt.Token) (any, error) {
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if t.Method != jwt.SigningMethodEdDSA {
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return nil, errors.New("only Ed25519/EdDSA supported")
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}
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return publicKey, nil
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})
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if err != nil {
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http.Error(rw, err.Error(), http.StatusUnauthorized)
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return
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}
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cacheLock.Lock()
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// Bound the cache: cc-backend mints short-lived, rotating tokens, so
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// without an upper limit the map would grow unbounded over the
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// lifetime of the process. When the cap is reached, evict any entries
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// that have expired; if none have, clear the cache entirely rather
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// than letting it grow without bound.
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if len(cache) >= maxTokenCacheSize {
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for k, t := range cache {
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if t.Claims.Valid() != nil {
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delete(cache, k)
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}
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}
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if len(cache) >= maxTokenCacheSize {
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clear(cache)
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}
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}
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cache[rawtoken] = token
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cacheLock.Unlock()
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// Let request through...
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next.ServeHTTP(rw, r)
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})
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}
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