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Eitzinger \nDate: Thu Jun 4 18:33:30 2026 +0200\n\n Fix issues after security audit\n \n Entire-Checkpoint: bc18358a9343\n\n CLAUDE.md | 18 ++++++++++++++++++\n cmd/cc-backend/server.go | 10 +++++++++-\n internal/api/api_test.go | 1 +\n internal/api/nats.go | 5 ++++-\n internal/api/nats_test.go | 1 +\n internal/auth/auth.go | 32 ++++++++++++++++----------------\n internal/auth/jwtCookieSession.go | 33 +++++++++++++++++++--------------\n 7 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)","stderr":"","interrupted":false,"isImage":false,"noOutputExpected":false},"sourceToolAssistantUUID":"6ce58e39-a103-4875-810a-5ab10346a60b","userType":"external","entrypoint":"cli","cwd":"/Users/jan/prg/ClusterCockpit/cc-backend","sessionId":"135c59e3-1efb-44ab-aebd-4144ab7553b9","version":"2.1.162","gitBranch":"release/v1.5"} 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feature/add_subcluster_filter\n4c59aee3 feat: add subCluster filter to filter component\n2ca3285c Upgrade dependencies\n86bc14b6 Merge branch 'main' into release/v1.5\n196f659a Merge pull request #547 from ClusterCockpit/546_fix_roofline_legends\nac7865d5 fix: change to fixed legend coordinates instead of dynamic placement\ne45b5f70 fix: Changes in frontend ui\n30010866 Merge pull request #544 from ClusterCockpit/hotfix\n573f7d14 Update ReleaseNotes\n38cbc33f Merge pull request #543 from ClusterCockpit/hotfix\n43807ae1 feat: Also submit projects array via oidc token","stderr":"","interrupted":false,"isImage":false,"noOutputExpected":false},"sourceToolAssistantUUID":"f7768278-6aad-4da6-93bf-20d0e1f23ea4","userType":"external","entrypoint":"cli","cwd":"/Users/jan/prg/ClusterCockpit/cc-backend","sessionId":"135c59e3-1efb-44ab-aebd-4144ab7553b9","version":"2.1.162","gitBranch":"release/v1.5"} 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{"parentUuid":"946356c3-7dd1-4e7e-af3a-6530c9521fa2","isSidechain":false,"promptId":"7a77ddc6-2262-4b32-8011-df89cf5077ae","type":"user","message":{"role":"user","content":[{"tool_use_id":"toolu_0138J6JnHADtuyve5wQjzzER","type":"tool_result","content":"commit 6f7e262f3f665ab5b007805a2e707adf8d7b4cd9\nAuthor: Jan Eitzinger \nDate: Thu Jun 4 18:33:30 2026 +0200\n\n Fix issues after security audit\n \n Entire-Checkpoint: bc18358a9343\n\ndiff --git a/CLAUDE.md b/CLAUDE.md\nindex 061d056b..fe6a7aab 100644\n--- a/CLAUDE.md\n+++ b/CLAUDE.md\n@@ -314,6 +314,24 @@ job,function=stop_job event=\"{\\\"jobId\\\":123,\\\"cluster\\\":\\\"test\\\",\\\"startTime\\\":1\n - Messages are logged; no responses are sent back to publishers\n - If NATS client is unavailable, API subscriptions are skipped (logged as warning)\n \n+### Security Considerations\n+\n+**The NATS API has no application-layer authentication or authorization.** Unlike\n+the REST endpoints (which require a JWT with `RoleAPI`), the subscribers process\n+any message delivered on the configured subjects. Anyone with publish rights to\n+those subjects on the broker can:\n+\n+- Insert arbitrary jobs (potentially attributed to other users)\n+- Mark running jobs as stopped, triggering archive/finalization\n+- Overwrite node state and health metadata for any cluster\n+\n+Operators MUST restrict publish ACLs at the NATS broker (per-account or\n+per-subject permissions) so that only trusted producers — e.g. the scheduler\n+integration on a known host or service account — can publish to the configured\n+`subject-job-event` and `subject-node-state` subjects. A shared, unrestricted\n+NATS broker is not a safe deployment topology for this API. A startup warning\n+is logged when these subscriptions are enabled.\n+\n ## Development Guidelines\n \n ### Performance\ndiff --git a/cmd/cc-backend/server.go b/cmd/cc-backend/server.go\nindex 85503535..33504988 100644\n--- a/cmd/cc-backend/server.go\n+++ b/cmd/cc-backend/server.go\n@@ -129,11 +129,19 @@ func (s *Server) init() error {\n \ts.router.Use(middleware.Compress(5))\n \ts.router.Use(middleware.Recoverer)\n \ts.router.Use(cors.Handler(cors.Options{\n-\t\tAllowCredentials: true,\n+\t\tAllowCredentials: false,\n \t\tAllowedHeaders: []string{\"X-Requested-With\", \"Content-Type\", \"Authorization\", \"Origin\"},\n \t\tAllowedMethods: []string{\"GET\", \"POST\", \"HEAD\", \"OPTIONS\"},\n \t\tAllowedOrigins: []string{\"*\"},\n \t}))\n+\ts.router.Use(func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {\n+\t\treturn http.HandlerFunc(func(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n+\t\t\tif r.TLS != nil || r.Header.Get(\"X-Forwarded-Proto\") == \"https\" {\n+\t\t\t\trw.Header().Set(\"Strict-Transport-Security\", \"max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains\")\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\tnext.ServeHTTP(rw, r)\n+\t\t})\n+\t})\n \n \ts.restAPIHandle = api.New()\n \ndiff --git a/internal/api/api_test.go b/internal/api/api_test.go\nindex a8aef889..26ee456a 100644\n--- a/internal/api/api_test.go\n+++ b/internal/api/api_test.go\n@@ -170,6 +170,7 @@ func setup(t *testing.T) *api.RestAPI {\n \n \tarchiver.Start(repository.GetJobRepository(), context.Background())\n \n+\tt.Setenv(\"SESSION_KEY\", \"AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=\")\n \tif cfg := ccconf.GetPackageConfig(\"auth\"); cfg != nil {\n \t\tauth.Init(&cfg)\n \t} else {\ndiff --git a/internal/api/nats.go b/internal/api/nats.go\nindex db33c0e2..0c967b83 100644\n--- a/internal/api/nats.go\n+++ b/internal/api/nats.go\n@@ -151,7 +151,10 @@ func (api *NatsAPI) StartSubscriptions() error {\n \t\t\treturn err\n \t\t}\n \n-\t\tcclog.Info(\"NATS API subscriptions started\")\n+\t\tcclog.Warnf(\"NATS API subscriptions started on subjects %q and %q — these are UNAUTHENTICATED: \"+\n+\t\t\t\"anyone with publish rights on the broker can start/stop jobs and update node state. \"+\n+\t\t\t\"Restrict publish ACLs on the NATS broker to trusted producers only.\",\n+\t\t\ts.SubjectJobEvent, s.SubjectNodeState)\n \t}\n \treturn nil\n }\ndiff --git a/internal/api/nats_test.go b/internal/api/nats_test.go\nindex b1d2a624..cc0bdf90 100644\n--- a/internal/api/nats_test.go\n+++ b/internal/api/nats_test.go\n@@ -156,6 +156,7 @@ func setupNatsTest(t *testing.T) *NatsAPI {\n \n \tarchiver.Start(repository.GetJobRepository(), context.Background())\n \n+\tt.Setenv(\"SESSION_KEY\", \"AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=\")\n \tif cfg := ccconf.GetPackageConfig(\"auth\"); cfg != nil {\n \t\tauth.Init(&cfg)\n \t} else {\ndiff --git a/internal/auth/auth.go b/internal/auth/auth.go\nindex d1c004bd..8d8bc222 100644\n--- a/internal/auth/auth.go\n+++ b/internal/auth/auth.go\n@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ package auth\n import (\n \t\"bytes\"\n \t\"context\"\n-\t\"crypto/rand\"\n \t\"database/sql\"\n \t\"encoding/base64\"\n \t\"encoding/json\"\n@@ -17,6 +16,7 @@ import (\n \t\"fmt\"\n \t\"net\"\n \t\"net/http\"\n+\t\"net/url\"\n \t\"os\"\n \t\"sync\"\n \t\"time\"\n@@ -187,19 +187,15 @@ func Init(authCfg *json.RawMessage) {\n \n \t\tsessKey := os.Getenv(\"SESSION_KEY\")\n \t\tif sessKey == \"\" {\n-\t\t\tcclog.Warn(\"environment variable 'SESSION_KEY' not set (will use non-persistent random key)\")\n-\t\t\tbytes := make([]byte, 32)\n-\t\t\tif _, err := rand.Read(bytes); err != nil {\n-\t\t\t\tcclog.Fatal(\"Error while initializing authentication -> failed to generate random bytes for session key\")\n-\t\t\t}\n-\t\t\tauthInstance.sessionStore = sessions.NewCookieStore(bytes)\n-\t\t} else {\n-\t\t\tbytes, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(sessKey)\n-\t\t\tif err != nil {\n-\t\t\t\tcclog.Fatal(\"Error while initializing authentication -> decoding session key failed\")\n-\t\t\t}\n-\t\t\tauthInstance.sessionStore = sessions.NewCookieStore(bytes)\n+\t\t\tcclog.Fatal(\"environment variable 'SESSION_KEY' not set: refusing to start with an ephemeral session key. \" +\n+\t\t\t\t\"Set SESSION_KEY in .env (base64-encoded 32 random bytes); a random key would invalidate all sessions on every restart \" +\n+\t\t\t\t\"and prevent sessions from validating across replicas.\")\n \t\t}\n+\t\tkeyBytes, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(sessKey)\n+\t\tif err != nil {\n+\t\t\tcclog.Fatal(\"Error while initializing authentication -> decoding session key failed\")\n+\t\t}\n+\t\tauthInstance.sessionStore = sessions.NewCookieStore(keyBytes)\n \n \t\tif d, err := time.ParseDuration(config.Keys.SessionMaxAge); err == nil {\n \t\t\tauthInstance.SessionMaxAge = d\n@@ -325,6 +321,7 @@ func (auth *Authentication) SaveSession(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request,\n \t\tsession.Options.Secure = false\n \t}\n \tsession.Options.SameSite = http.SameSiteLaxMode\n+\tsession.Options.HttpOnly = true\n \tsession.Values[\"username\"] = user.Username\n \tsession.Values[\"projects\"] = user.Projects\n \tsession.Values[\"roles\"] = user.Roles\n@@ -388,9 +385,12 @@ func (auth *Authentication) Login(\n \t\t\tcclog.Infof(\"login successfull: user: %#v (roles: %v, projects: %v)\", user.Username, user.Roles, user.Projects)\n \t\t\tctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), repository.ContextUserKey, user)\n \n-\t\t\tif r.FormValue(\"redirect\") != \"\" {\n-\t\t\t\thttp.RedirectHandler(r.FormValue(\"redirect\"), http.StatusFound).ServeHTTP(rw, r.WithContext(ctx))\n-\t\t\t\treturn\n+\t\t\tif redirect := r.FormValue(\"redirect\"); redirect != \"\" {\n+\t\t\t\tif u, perr := url.Parse(redirect); perr == nil && u.Scheme == \"\" && u.Host == \"\" {\n+\t\t\t\t\thttp.RedirectHandler(redirect, http.StatusFound).ServeHTTP(rw, r.WithContext(ctx))\n+\t\t\t\t\treturn\n+\t\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\t\tcclog.Warnf(\"login redirect rejected (not a relative path): %q\", redirect)\n \t\t\t}\n \n \t\t\thttp.RedirectHandler(\"/\", http.StatusFound).ServeHTTP(rw, r.WithContext(ctx))\ndiff --git a/internal/auth/jwtCookieSession.go b/internal/auth/jwtCookieSession.go\nindex 4c4bbeb6..f16dbe5e 100644\n--- a/internal/auth/jwtCookieSession.go\n+++ b/internal/auth/jwtCookieSession.go\n@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import (\n \t\"crypto/ed25519\"\n \t\"encoding/base64\"\n \t\"errors\"\n+\t\"fmt\"\n \t\"net/http\"\n \t\"os\"\n \n@@ -119,22 +120,26 @@ func (ja *JWTCookieSessionAuthenticator) Login(\n \t\trawtoken = jwtCookie.Value\n \t}\n \n-\ttoken, err := jwt.Parse(rawtoken, func(t *jwt.Token) (any, error) {\n-\t\tif t.Method != jwt.SigningMethodEdDSA {\n-\t\t\treturn nil, errors.New(\"only Ed25519/EdDSA supported\")\n-\t\t}\n+\tparser := jwt.NewParser(jwt.WithValidMethods([]string{jwt.SigningMethodEdDSA.Alg()}))\n \n-\t\tunvalidatedIssuer, success := t.Claims.(jwt.MapClaims)[\"iss\"].(string)\n-\t\tif success && unvalidatedIssuer == jc.TrustedIssuer {\n-\t\t\t// The (unvalidated) issuer seems to be the expected one,\n-\t\t\t// use public cross login key from config\n-\t\t\treturn ja.publicKeyCrossLogin, nil\n-\t\t}\n+\tunverified, _, perr := parser.ParseUnverified(rawtoken, jwt.MapClaims{})\n+\tif perr != nil {\n+\t\tcclog.Warn(\"JWT cookie session: error while parsing token\")\n+\t\treturn nil, perr\n+\t}\n+\tissuer, _ := unverified.Claims.(jwt.MapClaims)[\"iss\"].(string)\n+\n+\tvar key any\n+\tswitch issuer {\n+\tcase jc.TrustedIssuer:\n+\t\tkey = ja.publicKeyCrossLogin\n+\tcase \"\":\n+\t\tkey = ja.publicKey\n+\tdefault:\n+\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"untrusted JWT issuer: %q\", issuer)\n+\t}\n \n-\t\t// No cross login key configured or issuer not expected\n-\t\t// Try own key\n-\t\treturn ja.publicKey, nil\n-\t})\n+\ttoken, err := parser.Parse(rawtoken, func(*jwt.Token) (any, error) { return key, nil })\n \tif err != nil {\n \t\tcclog.Warn(\"JWT cookie session: error while parsing token\")\n \t\treturn nil, err","is_error":false}]},"uuid":"4a6d1bf3-182a-4ab9-a625-17c19424cbce","timestamp":"2026-06-04T16:40:47.009Z","toolUseResult":{"stdout":"commit 6f7e262f3f665ab5b007805a2e707adf8d7b4cd9\nAuthor: Jan Eitzinger \nDate: Thu Jun 4 18:33:30 2026 +0200\n\n Fix issues after security audit\n \n Entire-Checkpoint: bc18358a9343\n\ndiff --git a/CLAUDE.md b/CLAUDE.md\nindex 061d056b..fe6a7aab 100644\n--- a/CLAUDE.md\n+++ b/CLAUDE.md\n@@ -314,6 +314,24 @@ job,function=stop_job event=\"{\\\"jobId\\\":123,\\\"cluster\\\":\\\"test\\\",\\\"startTime\\\":1\n - Messages are logged; no responses are sent back to publishers\n - If NATS client is unavailable, API subscriptions are skipped (logged as warning)\n \n+### Security Considerations\n+\n+**The NATS API has no application-layer authentication or authorization.** Unlike\n+the REST endpoints (which require a JWT with `RoleAPI`), the subscribers process\n+any message delivered on the configured subjects. Anyone with publish rights to\n+those subjects on the broker can:\n+\n+- Insert arbitrary jobs (potentially attributed to other users)\n+- Mark running jobs as stopped, triggering archive/finalization\n+- Overwrite node state and health metadata for any cluster\n+\n+Operators MUST restrict publish ACLs at the NATS broker (per-account or\n+per-subject permissions) so that only trusted producers — e.g. the scheduler\n+integration on a known host or service account — can publish to the configured\n+`subject-job-event` and `subject-node-state` subjects. A shared, unrestricted\n+NATS broker is not a safe deployment topology for this API. A startup warning\n+is logged when these subscriptions are enabled.\n+\n ## Development Guidelines\n \n ### Performance\ndiff --git a/cmd/cc-backend/server.go b/cmd/cc-backend/server.go\nindex 85503535..33504988 100644\n--- a/cmd/cc-backend/server.go\n+++ b/cmd/cc-backend/server.go\n@@ -129,11 +129,19 @@ func (s *Server) init() error {\n \ts.router.Use(middleware.Compress(5))\n \ts.router.Use(middleware.Recoverer)\n \ts.router.Use(cors.Handler(cors.Options{\n-\t\tAllowCredentials: true,\n+\t\tAllowCredentials: false,\n \t\tAllowedHeaders: []string{\"X-Requested-With\", \"Content-Type\", \"Authorization\", \"Origin\"},\n \t\tAllowedMethods: []string{\"GET\", \"POST\", \"HEAD\", \"OPTIONS\"},\n \t\tAllowedOrigins: []string{\"*\"},\n \t}))\n+\ts.router.Use(func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {\n+\t\treturn http.HandlerFunc(func(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n+\t\t\tif r.TLS != nil || r.Header.Get(\"X-Forwarded-Proto\") == \"https\" {\n+\t\t\t\trw.Header().Set(\"Strict-Transport-Security\", \"max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains\")\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\tnext.ServeHTTP(rw, r)\n+\t\t})\n+\t})\n \n \ts.restAPIHandle = api.New()\n \ndiff --git a/internal/api/api_test.go b/internal/api/api_test.go\nindex a8aef889..26ee456a 100644\n--- a/internal/api/api_test.go\n+++ b/internal/api/api_test.go\n@@ -170,6 +170,7 @@ func setup(t *testing.T) *api.RestAPI {\n \n \tarchiver.Start(repository.GetJobRepository(), context.Background())\n \n+\tt.Setenv(\"SESSION_KEY\", \"AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=\")\n \tif cfg := ccconf.GetPackageConfig(\"auth\"); cfg != nil {\n \t\tauth.Init(&cfg)\n \t} else {\ndiff --git a/internal/api/nats.go b/internal/api/nats.go\nindex db33c0e2..0c967b83 100644\n--- a/internal/api/nats.go\n+++ b/internal/api/nats.go\n@@ -151,7 +151,10 @@ func (api *NatsAPI) StartSubscriptions() error {\n \t\t\treturn err\n \t\t}\n \n-\t\tcclog.Info(\"NATS API subscriptions started\")\n+\t\tcclog.Warnf(\"NATS API subscriptions started on subjects %q and %q — these are UNAUTHENTICATED: \"+\n+\t\t\t\"anyone with publish rights on the broker can start/stop jobs and update node state. \"+\n+\t\t\t\"Restrict publish ACLs on the NATS broker to trusted producers only.\",\n+\t\t\ts.SubjectJobEvent, s.SubjectNodeState)\n \t}\n \treturn nil\n }\ndiff --git a/internal/api/nats_test.go b/internal/api/nats_test.go\nindex b1d2a624..cc0bdf90 100644\n--- a/internal/api/nats_test.go\n+++ b/internal/api/nats_test.go\n@@ -156,6 +156,7 @@ func setupNatsTest(t *testing.T) *NatsAPI {\n \n \tarchiver.Start(repository.GetJobRepository(), context.Background())\n \n+\tt.Setenv(\"SESSION_KEY\", \"AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=\")\n \tif cfg := ccconf.GetPackageConfig(\"auth\"); cfg != nil {\n \t\tauth.Init(&cfg)\n \t} else {\ndiff --git a/internal/auth/auth.go b/internal/auth/auth.go\nindex d1c004bd..8d8bc222 100644\n--- a/internal/auth/auth.go\n+++ b/internal/auth/auth.go\n@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ package auth\n import (\n \t\"bytes\"\n \t\"context\"\n-\t\"crypto/rand\"\n \t\"database/sql\"\n \t\"encoding/base64\"\n \t\"encoding/json\"\n@@ -17,6 +16,7 @@ import (\n \t\"fmt\"\n \t\"net\"\n \t\"net/http\"\n+\t\"net/url\"\n \t\"os\"\n \t\"sync\"\n \t\"time\"\n@@ -187,19 +187,15 @@ func Init(authCfg *json.RawMessage) {\n \n \t\tsessKey := os.Getenv(\"SESSION_KEY\")\n \t\tif sessKey == \"\" {\n-\t\t\tcclog.Warn(\"environment variable 'SESSION_KEY' not set (will use non-persistent random key)\")\n-\t\t\tbytes := make([]byte, 32)\n-\t\t\tif _, err := rand.Read(bytes); err != nil {\n-\t\t\t\tcclog.Fatal(\"Error while initializing authentication -> failed to generate random bytes for session key\")\n-\t\t\t}\n-\t\t\tauthInstance.sessionStore = sessions.NewCookieStore(bytes)\n-\t\t} else {\n-\t\t\tbytes, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(sessKey)\n-\t\t\tif err != nil {\n-\t\t\t\tcclog.Fatal(\"Error while initializing authentication -> decoding session key failed\")\n-\t\t\t}\n-\t\t\tauthInstance.sessionStore = sessions.NewCookieStore(bytes)\n+\t\t\tcclog.Fatal(\"environment variable 'SESSION_KEY' not set: refusing to start with an ephemeral session key. \" +\n+\t\t\t\t\"Set SESSION_KEY in .env (base64-encoded 32 random bytes); a random key would invalidate all sessions on every restart \" +\n+\t\t\t\t\"and prevent sessions from validating across replicas.\")\n \t\t}\n+\t\tkeyBytes, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(sessKey)\n+\t\tif err != nil {\n+\t\t\tcclog.Fatal(\"Error while initializing authentication -> decoding session key failed\")\n+\t\t}\n+\t\tauthInstance.sessionStore = sessions.NewCookieStore(keyBytes)\n \n \t\tif d, err := time.ParseDuration(config.Keys.SessionMaxAge); err == nil {\n \t\t\tauthInstance.SessionMaxAge = d\n@@ -325,6 +321,7 @@ func (auth *Authentication) SaveSession(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request,\n \t\tsession.Options.Secure = false\n \t}\n \tsession.Options.SameSite = http.SameSiteLaxMode\n+\tsession.Options.HttpOnly = true\n \tsession.Values[\"username\"] = user.Username\n \tsession.Values[\"projects\"] = user.Projects\n \tsession.Values[\"roles\"] = user.Roles\n@@ -388,9 +385,12 @@ func (auth *Authentication) Login(\n \t\t\tcclog.Infof(\"login successfull: user: %#v (roles: %v, projects: %v)\", user.Username, user.Roles, user.Projects)\n \t\t\tctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), repository.ContextUserKey, user)\n \n-\t\t\tif r.FormValue(\"redirect\") != \"\" {\n-\t\t\t\thttp.RedirectHandler(r.FormValue(\"redirect\"), http.StatusFound).ServeHTTP(rw, r.WithContext(ctx))\n-\t\t\t\treturn\n+\t\t\tif redirect := r.FormValue(\"redirect\"); redirect != \"\" {\n+\t\t\t\tif u, perr := url.Parse(redirect); perr == nil && u.Scheme == \"\" && u.Host == \"\" {\n+\t\t\t\t\thttp.RedirectHandler(redirect, http.StatusFound).ServeHTTP(rw, r.WithContext(ctx))\n+\t\t\t\t\treturn\n+\t\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\t\tcclog.Warnf(\"login redirect rejected (not a relative path): %q\", redirect)\n \t\t\t}\n \n \t\t\thttp.RedirectHandler(\"/\", http.StatusFound).ServeHTTP(rw, r.WithContext(ctx))\ndiff --git a/internal/auth/jwtCookieSession.go b/internal/auth/jwtCookieSession.go\nindex 4c4bbeb6..f16dbe5e 100644\n--- a/internal/auth/jwtCookieSession.go\n+++ b/internal/auth/jwtCookieSession.go\n@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import (\n \t\"crypto/ed25519\"\n \t\"encoding/base64\"\n \t\"errors\"\n+\t\"fmt\"\n \t\"net/http\"\n \t\"os\"\n \n@@ -119,22 +120,26 @@ func (ja *JWTCookieSessionAuthenticator) Login(\n \t\trawtoken = jwtCookie.Value\n \t}\n \n-\ttoken, err := jwt.Parse(rawtoken, func(t *jwt.Token) (any, error) {\n-\t\tif t.Method != jwt.SigningMethodEdDSA {\n-\t\t\treturn nil, errors.New(\"only Ed25519/EdDSA supported\")\n-\t\t}\n+\tparser := jwt.NewParser(jwt.WithValidMethods([]string{jwt.SigningMethodEdDSA.Alg()}))\n \n-\t\tunvalidatedIssuer, success := t.Claims.(jwt.MapClaims)[\"iss\"].(string)\n-\t\tif success && unvalidatedIssuer == jc.TrustedIssuer {\n-\t\t\t// The (unvalidated) issuer seems to be the expected one,\n-\t\t\t// use public cross login key from config\n-\t\t\treturn ja.publicKeyCrossLogin, nil\n-\t\t}\n+\tunverified, _, perr := parser.ParseUnverified(rawtoken, jwt.MapClaims{})\n+\tif perr != nil {\n+\t\tcclog.Warn(\"JWT cookie session: error while parsing token\")\n+\t\treturn nil, perr\n+\t}\n+\tissuer, _ := unverified.Claims.(jwt.MapClaims)[\"iss\"].(string)\n+\n+\tvar key any\n+\tswitch issuer {\n+\tcase jc.TrustedIssuer:\n+\t\tkey = ja.publicKeyCrossLogin\n+\tcase \"\":\n+\t\tkey = ja.publicKey\n+\tdefault:\n+\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"untrusted JWT issuer: %q\", issuer)\n+\t}\n \n-\t\t// No cross login key configured or issuer not expected\n-\t\t// Try own key\n-\t\treturn ja.publicKey, nil\n-\t})\n+\ttoken, err := parser.Parse(rawtoken, func(*jwt.Token) (any, error) { return key, nil })\n \tif err != nil {\n \t\tcclog.Warn(\"JWT cookie session: error while parsing token\")\n \t\treturn nil, err","stderr":"","interrupted":false,"isImage":false,"noOutputExpected":false},"sourceToolAssistantUUID":"946356c3-7dd1-4e7e-af3a-6530c9521fa2","userType":"external","entrypoint":"cli","cwd":"/Users/jan/prg/ClusterCockpit/cc-backend","sessionId":"135c59e3-1efb-44ab-aebd-4144ab7553b9","version":"2.1.162","gitBranch":"release/v1.5"} {"type":"last-prompt","lastPrompt":"I did a security review with Opus 4.7 . Fixes are already applied. Repeat the audit and check if anything severe was missed in the previous audit","leafUuid":"4a6d1bf3-182a-4ab9-a625-17c19424cbce","sessionId":"135c59e3-1efb-44ab-aebd-4144ab7553b9"} {"type":"ai-title","aiTitle":"Repeat security audit after fixes","sessionId":"135c59e3-1efb-44ab-aebd-4144ab7553b9"} {"type":"mode","mode":"normal","sessionId":"135c59e3-1efb-44ab-aebd-4144ab7553b9"} {"type":"permission-mode","permissionMode":"default","sessionId":"135c59e3-1efb-44ab-aebd-4144ab7553b9"} {"parentUuid":"4a6d1bf3-182a-4ab9-a625-17c19424cbce","isSidechain":false,"message":{"model":"claude-opus-4-8","id":"msg_01CNzchJft8ZaMeJ9bkLv4iC","type":"message","role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"thinking","thinking":"","signature":"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"}],"stop_reason":"tool_use","stop_sequence":null,"stop_details":null,"usage":{"input_tokens":2,"cache_creation_input_tokens":4398,"cache_read_input_tokens":28095,"output_tokens":4763,"server_tool_use":{"web_search_requests":0,"web_fetch_requests":0},"service_tier":"standard","cache_creation":{"ephemeral_1h_input_tokens":4398,"ephemeral_5m_input_tokens":0},"inference_geo":"not_available","iterations":[{"input_tokens":2,"output_tokens":4763,"cache_read_input_tokens":28095,"cache_creation_input_tokens":4398,"cache_creation":{"ephemeral_5m_input_tokens":0,"ephemeral_1h_input_tokens":4398},"type":"message"}],"speed":"standard"},"diagnostics":null},"requestId":"req_011CbiYwXMsypJZMmFQvmGBL","type":"assistant","uuid":"6e83f099-bab5-4912-a468-282b4689417b","timestamp":"2026-06-04T16:41:32.332Z","userType":"external","entrypoint":"cli","cwd":"/Users/jan/prg/ClusterCockpit/cc-backend","sessionId":"135c59e3-1efb-44ab-aebd-4144ab7553b9","version":"2.1.162","gitBranch":"release/v1.5"} {"parentUuid":"6e83f099-bab5-4912-a468-282b4689417b","isSidechain":false,"message":{"model":"claude-opus-4-8","id":"msg_01CNzchJft8ZaMeJ9bkLv4iC","type":"message","role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"text","text":"Now I understand the previous audit. It fixed: JWT algorithm/issuer confusion, SESSION_KEY enforcement, HttpOnly cookies, open redirect on login, CORS credentials, HSTS, and NATS auth warnings.\n\nLet me do a fresh independent audit. I'll fan out parallel agents across distinct attack surfaces to catch anything missed."}],"stop_reason":"tool_use","stop_sequence":null,"stop_details":null,"usage":{"input_tokens":2,"cache_creation_input_tokens":4398,"cache_read_input_tokens":28095,"output_tokens":4763,"server_tool_use":{"web_search_requests":0,"web_fetch_requests":0},"service_tier":"standard","cache_creation":{"ephemeral_1h_input_tokens":4398,"ephemeral_5m_input_tokens":0},"inference_geo":"not_available","iterations":[{"input_tokens":2,"output_tokens":4763,"cache_read_input_tokens":28095,"cache_creation_input_tokens":4398,"cache_creation":{"ephemeral_5m_input_tokens":0,"ephemeral_1h_input_tokens":4398},"type":"message"}],"speed":"standard"},"diagnostics":null},"requestId":"req_011CbiYwXMsypJZMmFQvmGBL","type":"assistant","uuid":"bf77d129-add7-4fd4-80d1-41e1e416d376","timestamp":"2026-06-04T16:41:32.334Z","userType":"external","entrypoint":"cli","cwd":"/Users/jan/prg/ClusterCockpit/cc-backend","sessionId":"135c59e3-1efb-44ab-aebd-4144ab7553b9","version":"2.1.162","gitBranch":"release/v1.5"} {"parentUuid":"bf77d129-add7-4fd4-80d1-41e1e416d376","isSidechain":false,"message":{"model":"claude-opus-4-8","id":"msg_01CNzchJft8ZaMeJ9bkLv4iC","type":"message","role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"tool_use","id":"toolu_014MtKrAKQ3zeGaTdetcokVJ","name":"Agent","input":{"description":"Audit auth and session handling","prompt":"You are a security auditor doing a focused review of the ClusterCockpit cc-backend Go repository at /Users/jan/prg/ClusterCockpit/cc-backend.\n\nScope: Authentication and authorization ONLY. Focus on:\n- internal/auth/* (auth.go, jwt*.go, ldap.go, oidc.go, local.go, jwtCookieSession.go, jwtSession.go)\n- How JWT tokens are validated (signature, expiry, algorithm, audience, issuer)\n- Session cookie security\n- LDAP injection / bind handling\n- OIDC flow (state/nonce/PKCE, token validation, redirect handling)\n- Rate limiting on login\n- Role assignment and privilege escalation paths\n- API token / RoleAPI handling\n\nA previous audit ALREADY FIXED these (do NOT re-report them):\n1. JWT algorithm confusion + issuer validation in jwtCookieSession.go (now uses ParseUnverified + switch on issuer + WithValidMethods)\n2. SESSION_KEY now fatal if unset (was ephemeral random)\n3. session cookie HttpOnly=true added\n4. open redirect on login redirect param fixed (now checks relative path)\n5. CORS AllowCredentials=false + HSTS header\n\nFind anything SEVERE that was MISSED. For each finding: file:line, severity (critical/high/medium/low), concrete exploit scenario, and a suggested fix. Be precise and verify claims by reading the actual code. Do not report theoretical issues without code evidence. Report only real findings; if an area is clean, say so briefly.","subagent_type":"general-purpose"},"caller":{"type":"direct"}}],"stop_reason":"tool_use","stop_sequence":null,"stop_details":null,"usage":{"input_tokens":2,"cache_creation_input_tokens":4398,"cache_read_input_tokens":28095,"output_tokens":4763,"server_tool_use":{"web_search_requests":0,"web_fetch_requests":0},"service_tier":"standard","cache_creation":{"ephemeral_1h_input_tokens":4398,"ephemeral_5m_input_tokens":0},"inference_geo":"not_available","iterations":[{"input_tokens":2,"output_tokens":4763,"cache_read_input_tokens":28095,"cache_creation_input_tokens":4398,"cache_creation":{"ephemeral_5m_input_tokens":0,"ephemeral_1h_input_tokens":4398},"type":"message"}],"speed":"standard"},"diagnostics":null},"requestId":"req_011CbiYwXMsypJZMmFQvmGBL","type":"assistant","uuid":"f08f0756-8628-46eb-a230-d579735f63fe","timestamp":"2026-06-04T16:41:32.449Z","userType":"external","entrypoint":"cli","cwd":"/Users/jan/prg/ClusterCockpit/cc-backend","sessionId":"135c59e3-1efb-44ab-aebd-4144ab7553b9","version":"2.1.162","gitBranch":"release/v1.5"} {"parentUuid":"f08f0756-8628-46eb-a230-d579735f63fe","isSidechain":false,"message":{"model":"claude-opus-4-8","id":"msg_01CNzchJft8ZaMeJ9bkLv4iC","type":"message","role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"tool_use","id":"toolu_01EPq1WotNXaigWMsoNj28uJ","name":"Agent","input":{"description":"Audit REST API endpoints","prompt":"You are a security auditor doing a focused review of the ClusterCockpit cc-backend Go repository at /Users/jan/prg/ClusterCockpit/cc-backend.\n\nScope: REST API ONLY. Files in internal/api/*.go (rest.go, and all handler files; EXCLUDE nats.go which is covered elsewhere).\n\nFocus on:\n- Authorization checks on each endpoint: is RoleAPI / RoleAdmin / RoleUser enforced consistently? Look for endpoints missing auth middleware or role checks.\n- IDOR / broken object-level authorization: can a user access/modify other users' jobs, tags, configurations? Check that user-supplied IDs are scoped to the requesting user where appropriate.\n- Input validation: integer parsing, unbounded queries, mass-assignment.\n- Path traversal in any endpoint that takes file paths or names.\n- SQL injection via query parameters passed to the repository layer.\n- Information disclosure in error messages.\n- Whether the routing in rest.go correctly applies auth middleware to all sensitive routes.\n\nTrace how routes are registered in rest.go (and cmd/cc-backend/server.go / router setup) and which middleware wraps them.\n\nFind anything SEVERE. For each finding: file:line, severity (critical/high/medium/low), concrete exploit scenario, and suggested fix. Verify claims by reading actual code. Report only real findings backed by code evidence; if clean, say so briefly.","subagent_type":"general-purpose"},"caller":{"type":"direct"}}],"stop_reason":"tool_use","stop_sequence":null,"stop_details":null,"usage":{"input_tokens":2,"cache_creation_input_tokens":4398,"cache_read_input_tokens":28095,"output_tokens":4763,"server_tool_use":{"web_search_requests":0,"web_fetch_requests":0},"service_tier":"standard","cache_creation":{"ephemeral_1h_input_tokens":4398,"ephemeral_5m_input_tokens":0},"inference_geo":"not_available","iterations":[{"input_tokens":2,"output_tokens":4763,"cache_read_input_tokens":28095,"cache_creation_input_tokens":4398,"cache_creation":{"ephemeral_5m_input_tokens":0,"ephemeral_1h_input_tokens":4398},"type":"message"}],"speed":"standard"},"diagnostics":null},"requestId":"req_011CbiYwXMsypJZMmFQvmGBL","type":"assistant","uuid":"a988b96b-36fd-4cd3-9ab1-8e9f4f87615c","timestamp":"2026-06-04T16:41:32.599Z","userType":"external","entrypoint":"cli","cwd":"/Users/jan/prg/ClusterCockpit/cc-backend","sessionId":"135c59e3-1efb-44ab-aebd-4144ab7553b9","version":"2.1.162","gitBranch":"release/v1.5"} {"parentUuid":"a988b96b-36fd-4cd3-9ab1-8e9f4f87615c","isSidechain":false,"message":{"model":"claude-opus-4-8","id":"msg_01CNzchJft8ZaMeJ9bkLv4iC","type":"message","role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"tool_use","id":"toolu_0127GXe94Rf11T1AzPAxYipg","name":"Agent","input":{"description":"Audit SQL and repository layer","prompt":"You are a security auditor reviewing the ClusterCockpit cc-backend Go repository at /Users/jan/prg/ClusterCockpit/cc-backend.\n\nScope: Data access / SQL layer ONLY. Files in internal/repository/*.go.\n\nFocus on:\n- SQL injection: find every place a query is built with string concatenation/fmt.Sprintf instead of parameterized queries or safe query builders (squirrel). Pay special attention to ORDER BY, column names, LIMIT/OFFSET, filter building, and any raw string interpolation of user input into SQL.\n- The query builder usage (sq / squirrel) — are user-controlled column/sort fields whitelisted?\n- Search/filter functions that take user input (job search, user search, tag filtering).\n- Any Exec/Query/Raw calls with interpolated strings.\n\nGrep for fmt.Sprintf near SQL, \"SELECT\", \"WHERE\", \"ORDER BY\", \".Query(\", \".Exec(\", \"+ \" string concat in query context.\n\nFind anything SEVERE. For each finding: file:line, severity, concrete exploit (what input triggers it), and suggested fix. Verify by reading the actual code and confirm the input is actually user-controlled (trace the caller). Report only real, code-backed findings; if clean, say so briefly.","subagent_type":"general-purpose"},"caller":{"type":"direct"}}],"stop_reason":"tool_use","stop_sequence":null,"stop_details":null,"usage":{"input_tokens":2,"cache_creation_input_tokens":4398,"cache_read_input_tokens":28095,"output_tokens":4763,"server_tool_use":{"web_search_requests":0,"web_fetch_requests":0},"service_tier":"standard","cache_creation":{"ephemeral_1h_input_tokens":4398,"ephemeral_5m_input_tokens":0},"inference_geo":"not_available","iterations":[{"input_tokens":2,"output_tokens":4763,"cache_read_input_tokens":28095,"cache_creation_input_tokens":4398,"cache_creation":{"ephemeral_5m_input_tokens":0,"ephemeral_1h_input_tokens":4398},"type":"message"}],"speed":"standard"},"diagnostics":null},"requestId":"req_011CbiYwXMsypJZMmFQvmGBL","type":"assistant","uuid":"c993526e-5a3d-466b-bfd6-2d606120f3b4","timestamp":"2026-06-04T16:41:32.676Z","userType":"external","entrypoint":"cli","cwd":"/Users/jan/prg/ClusterCockpit/cc-backend","sessionId":"135c59e3-1efb-44ab-aebd-4144ab7553b9","version":"2.1.162","gitBranch":"release/v1.5"} {"parentUuid":"c993526e-5a3d-466b-bfd6-2d606120f3b4","isSidechain":false,"message":{"model":"claude-opus-4-8","id":"msg_01CNzchJft8ZaMeJ9bkLv4iC","type":"message","role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"tool_use","id":"toolu_01ATuXeY1ge8qk9pvMrpsR8V","name":"Agent","input":{"description":"Audit file handling and archive","prompt":"You are a security auditor reviewing the ClusterCockpit cc-backend Go repository at /Users/jan/prg/ClusterCockpit/cc-backend.\n\nScope: File handling, path traversal, archive, and checkpoint I/O. Files in pkg/archive/* (including parquet subpkg), internal/archiver/*, pkg/metricstore/* (checkpoint.go, walCheckpoint.go), and any config file loading.\n\nFocus on:\n- Path traversal: any place where user-controlled input (cluster name, hostname, job ID, file names from API/NATS/config) is used to build filesystem paths via filepath.Join or string concatenation without sanitization. A malicious cluster/host/jobid containing \"../\" could read/write outside the archive root.\n- Zip/tar/parquet extraction (zip-slip).\n- S3 backend key construction.\n- Unsafe deserialization (JSON into types, gob, etc.) leading to resource exhaustion or code paths.\n- Symlink following.\n- Decompression bombs.\n\nGrep for filepath.Join, os.Open, os.Create, os.ReadFile, os.MkdirAll, path building with cluster/host/job variables.\n\nFind anything SEVERE. For each finding: file:line, severity, concrete exploit input, and suggested fix. Trace whether the input is actually attacker-controllable (e.g. comes from API/NATS request vs trusted config). Report only real, code-backed findings; if clean, say so briefly.","subagent_type":"general-purpose"},"caller":{"type":"direct"}}],"stop_reason":"tool_use","stop_sequence":null,"stop_details":null,"usage":{"input_tokens":2,"cache_creation_input_tokens":4398,"cache_read_input_tokens":28095,"output_tokens":4763,"server_tool_use":{"web_search_requests":0,"web_fetch_requests":0},"service_tier":"standard","cache_creation":{"ephemeral_1h_input_tokens":4398,"ephemeral_5m_input_tokens":0},"inference_geo":"not_available","iterations":[{"input_tokens":2,"output_tokens":4763,"cache_read_input_tokens":28095,"cache_creation_input_tokens":4398,"cache_creation":{"ephemeral_5m_input_tokens":0,"ephemeral_1h_input_tokens":4398},"type":"message"}],"speed":"standard"},"diagnostics":null},"requestId":"req_011CbiYwXMsypJZMmFQvmGBL","type":"assistant","uuid":"8041bc42-bdaa-498f-b58d-aacba641c6a9","timestamp":"2026-06-04T16:41:32.983Z","userType":"external","entrypoint":"cli","cwd":"/Users/jan/prg/ClusterCockpit/cc-backend","sessionId":"135c59e3-1efb-44ab-aebd-4144ab7553b9","version":"2.1.162","gitBranch":"release/v1.5"} {"parentUuid":"8041bc42-bdaa-498f-b58d-aacba641c6a9","isSidechain":false,"message":{"model":"claude-opus-4-8","id":"msg_01CNzchJft8ZaMeJ9bkLv4iC","type":"message","role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"tool_use","id":"toolu_01CaGTyFwK9VKFDnDqqgTQpT","name":"Agent","input":{"description":"Audit GraphQL and NATS","prompt":"You are a security auditor reviewing the ClusterCockpit cc-backend Go repository at /Users/jan/prg/ClusterCockpit/cc-backend.\n\nScope: GraphQL API and NATS API.\n- GraphQL: internal/graph/*.go (schema.resolvers.go, util*.go), api/schema.graphqls. Focus on authorization within resolvers (does each resolver check the requesting user's role/ownership before returning data?), IDOR (querying other users' jobs/metrics), query depth/complexity limits (DoS), and whether sensitive fields are exposed.\n- NATS: internal/api/nats.go. The previous audit ALREADY documented that NATS is unauthenticated and added a startup warning + docs (do NOT re-report the lack of authentication itself). Instead look for OTHER issues: input validation on parsed line-protocol messages, panics from malformed input (unhandled type assertions, nil derefs, slice bounds), resource exhaustion via worker pools, injection via job fields that flow into SQL or filesystem paths, integer overflow.\n\nFind anything SEVERE. For each finding: file:line, severity, concrete exploit scenario, and suggested fix. Verify by reading actual code. Report only real, code-backed findings; if clean, say so briefly.","subagent_type":"general-purpose"},"caller":{"type":"direct"}}],"stop_reason":"tool_use","stop_sequence":null,"stop_details":null,"usage":{"input_tokens":2,"cache_creation_input_tokens":4398,"cache_read_input_tokens":28095,"output_tokens":4763,"server_tool_use":{"web_search_requests":0,"web_fetch_requests":0},"service_tier":"standard","cache_creation":{"ephemeral_1h_input_tokens":4398,"ephemeral_5m_input_tokens":0},"inference_geo":"not_available","iterations":[{"input_tokens":2,"output_tokens":4763,"cache_read_input_tokens":28095,"cache_creation_input_tokens":4398,"cache_creation":{"ephemeral_5m_input_tokens":0,"ephemeral_1h_input_tokens":4398},"type":"message"}],"speed":"standard"},"diagnostics":null},"requestId":"req_011CbiYwXMsypJZMmFQvmGBL","type":"assistant","uuid":"28c7de6a-9de8-4303-8580-74e68268659a","timestamp":"2026-06-04T16:41:33.924Z","userType":"external","entrypoint":"cli","cwd":"/Users/jan/prg/ClusterCockpit/cc-backend","sessionId":"135c59e3-1efb-44ab-aebd-4144ab7553b9","version":"2.1.162","gitBranch":"release/v1.5"} {"parentUuid":"28c7de6a-9de8-4303-8580-74e68268659a","isSidechain":false,"message":{"model":"claude-opus-4-8","id":"msg_01CNzchJft8ZaMeJ9bkLv4iC","type":"message","role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"tool_use","id":"toolu_01MGMz4Nnrb2Xbh47FeVBTMy","name":"Agent","input":{"description":"Audit frontend and templates","prompt":"You are a security auditor reviewing the ClusterCockpit cc-backend Go repository at /Users/jan/prg/ClusterCockpit/cc-backend.\n\nScope: Web layer — server-side Go templates and frontend.\n- web/templates/*.tmpl and the Go code that renders them (internal/web/*.go or wherever template.Execute is called). Look for XSS: use of text/template instead of html/template, template.HTML / template.JS / template.URL wrappers around user data, unescaped injection of user-controlled values (usernames, job metadata, config) into HTML.\n- CSRF: are state-changing POST endpoints protected? Is there any CSRF token mechanism? (Note: the previous audit set session cookie SameSite=Lax and HttpOnly — consider whether that is sufficient for the state-changing endpoints.)\n- Content-Security-Policy and other security headers (look in cmd/cc-backend/server.go middleware).\n- Sensitive data passed to the frontend (secrets, tokens, other users' data) via template data or embedded JSON.\n- Frontend: web/frontend/src — look for dangerous innerHTML / {@html } usage with user data, and how API tokens / JWTs are stored client-side.\n\nFind anything SEVERE. For each finding: file:line, severity, concrete exploit scenario, and suggested fix. Verify by reading actual code. Report only real, code-backed findings; if clean, say so briefly.","subagent_type":"general-purpose"},"caller":{"type":"direct"}}],"stop_reason":"tool_use","stop_sequence":null,"stop_details":null,"usage":{"input_tokens":2,"cache_creation_input_tokens":4398,"cache_read_input_tokens":28095,"output_tokens":4763,"server_tool_use":{"web_search_requests":0,"web_fetch_requests":0},"service_tier":"standard","cache_creation":{"ephemeral_1h_input_tokens":4398,"ephemeral_5m_input_tokens":0},"inference_geo":"not_available","iterations":[{"input_tokens":2,"output_tokens":4763,"cache_read_input_tokens":28095,"cache_creation_input_tokens":4398,"cache_creation":{"ephemeral_5m_input_tokens":0,"ephemeral_1h_input_tokens":4398},"type":"message"}],"speed":"standard"},"diagnostics":null},"requestId":"req_011CbiYwXMsypJZMmFQvmGBL","type":"assistant","uuid":"0dee2c1f-4588-448b-8842-cbae1cf05783","timestamp":"2026-06-04T16:41:40.984Z","userType":"external","entrypoint":"cli","cwd":"/Users/jan/prg/ClusterCockpit/cc-backend","sessionId":"135c59e3-1efb-44ab-aebd-4144ab7553b9","version":"2.1.162","gitBranch":"release/v1.5"} {"parentUuid":"0dee2c1f-4588-448b-8842-cbae1cf05783","isSidechain":false,"message":{"model":"claude-opus-4-8","id":"msg_01CNzchJft8ZaMeJ9bkLv4iC","type":"message","role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"tool_use","id":"toolu_01VLYRYR8Xko3RJg8m2JDMqe","name":"Agent","input":{"description":"Audit secrets crypto and config","prompt":"You are a security auditor reviewing the ClusterCockpit cc-backend Go repository at /Users/jan/prg/ClusterCockpit/cc-backend.\n\nScope: Cryptography, secrets handling, configuration, and dependencies.\n\nFocus on:\n- Cryptographic usage: weak algorithms, insecure random (math/rand vs crypto/rand) for security-sensitive values (tokens, salts, session IDs, password reset), JWT key generation/loading, password hashing (what algorithm — bcrypt/argon2? cost factor?). Grep for math/rand, md5, sha1, des, ecb, crypto.\n- Secrets in config: are secrets (JWT private keys, LDAP bind password, NATS password, S3 keys) logged anywhere? Grep for cclog with password/key/secret/token. Any secrets written to disk insecurely or exposed via API/error messages?\n- .env / config loading: insecure defaults, hardcoded credentials, default admin passwords. Check configs/ and cmd/cc-backend.\n- Timing-safe comparison for token/password/HMAC comparisons (subtle.ConstantTimeCompare vs ==).\n- go.mod dependencies: any obviously outdated/vulnerable crypto or auth libraries.\n- Command injection: grep for os/exec, exec.Command with user input.\n\nFind anything SEVERE. For each finding: file:line, severity, concrete exploit scenario, and suggested fix. Verify by reading actual code. Report only real, code-backed findings; if clean, say so briefly.","subagent_type":"general-purpose"},"caller":{"type":"direct"}}],"stop_reason":"tool_use","stop_sequence":null,"stop_details":null,"usage":{"input_tokens":2,"cache_creation_input_tokens":4398,"cache_read_input_tokens":28095,"output_tokens":4763,"server_tool_use":{"web_search_requests":0,"web_fetch_requests":0},"service_tier":"standard","cache_creation":{"ephemeral_1h_input_tokens":4398,"ephemeral_5m_input_tokens":0},"inference_geo":"not_available","iterations":[{"input_tokens":2,"output_tokens":4763,"cache_read_input_tokens":28095,"cache_creation_input_tokens":4398,"cache_creation":{"ephemeral_5m_input_tokens":0,"ephemeral_1h_input_tokens":4398},"type":"message"}],"speed":"standard"},"diagnostics":null},"requestId":"req_011CbiYwXMsypJZMmFQvmGBL","type":"assistant","uuid":"b98aec04-0733-4b4a-8b07-f9c8214e4c14","timestamp":"2026-06-04T16:41:48.147Z","userType":"external","entrypoint":"cli","cwd":"/Users/jan/prg/ClusterCockpit/cc-backend","sessionId":"135c59e3-1efb-44ab-aebd-4144ab7553b9","version":"2.1.162","gitBranch":"release/v1.5"} {"parentUuid":"b98aec04-0733-4b4a-8b07-f9c8214e4c14","isSidechain":false,"promptId":"7a77ddc6-2262-4b32-8011-df89cf5077ae","type":"user","message":{"role":"user","content":[{"tool_use_id":"toolu_01VLYRYR8Xko3RJg8m2JDMqe","type":"tool_result","content":[{"type":"text","text":"Keygen uses crypto/rand correctly. I have enough to complete the audit. Let me do a final check on the user-supplied add-user password (no minimum length) and confirm there are no remaining concerns with the rate limiter (per IP+username — username enumeration / lockout bypass).\n\nThe audit is complete. Here are my findings.\n\n## Security Audit: Cryptography, Secrets, Config, Dependencies\n\nOverall the codebase is in good shape. No SEVERE/critical vulnerabilities found in scope. Cryptographic primitives are sound: Ed25519 JWTs, bcrypt password hashing, crypto/rand everywhere security-sensitive, modern TLS config, no weak algorithms (md5/sha1/des/ecb) anywhere, no `math/rand` for tokens/secrets. Dependencies are current. Below are the lower-severity observations worth noting.\n\n### Findings\n\n**1. LOW — Default/example secrets committed in tracked config files**\n- `configs/config.json:29` — NATS `\"username\":\"root\",\"password\":\"root\"`; `:57-67` metric-store tokens `\"MySecret\"`; `:45-46` S3 keys `\"xx\"`.\n- `configs/config-demo.json:19` — a real signed admin+api JWT (`sub:demo, roles:[admin,api]`).\n- These are tracked in git (`git ls-files` confirms), whereas the runtime `config.json` is correctly `.gitignore`d.\n- Verified non-exploitable: the placeholders are obvious dummies, and I decoded the demo JWT — it is signed with the demo key shipped in `configs/env-template.txt` and already expired (exp 2026-04-09). So this is hygiene, not a live leak. Fix: keep these as `.example`/`.template` files and ensure operators never deploy with the shipped `env-template.txt` keys.\n\n**2. LOW — `checkDefaultSecurityKeys()` only warns, doesn't block** — `cmd/cc-backend/main.go:217-224`. Detects the default `JWT_PUBLIC_KEY` and the demo `SESSION_KEY` is similarly only soft-handled. With the default Ed25519 keypair public in the repo, anyone can forge admin JWTs. It only logs a `Warn`. Mitigating factor: `SESSION_KEY` absence is correctly fatal (`auth.go:189-193`). Suggested: also fatal-error (or require an explicit `-dev` opt-in) when the known default JWT keypair is in use, mirroring the SESSION_KEY treatment.\n\n**3. LOW — No password strength/length enforcement for local accounts** — `cmd/cc-backend/main.go:226-244` (`addUser`) and `internal/api/user.go:180`. A local user can be created with an empty or trivial password; bcrypt is applied (`repository/user.go:150`, `bcrypt.DefaultCost`=10, fine) but no minimum policy. Login is rate-limited at 5/15min per IP+username (`auth.go:76`), which mitigates online brute force. Suggested: enforce a minimum length on local-password creation.\n\n### Verified-safe (no action needed)\n- **JWT verification**: `jwt.go:86-92` pins `SigningMethodEdDSA` (no alg-confusion). `jwtCookieSession.go:123,142` uses `WithValidMethods([EdDSA])` and correctly routes keys by issuer (`TrustedIssuer`→cross-login key, `\"\"`→internal key, else reject). `jwtSession.go` HS256/HS512 path uses a separate dedicated `CROSS_LOGIN_JWT_HS512_KEY`, not the Ed25519 key — no HMAC/asymmetric key confusion.\n- **Password compare**: bcrypt's `CompareHashAndPassword` is constant-time (`local.go:41`). No raw `==` comparisons on secrets/tokens anywhere; token equality is delegated to the JWT library's signature verification.\n- **Command injection**: `internal/api/log.go:92` uses `exec.CommandContext(\"journalctl\", args...)` — no shell, admin-role-gated (`:34`), and free-text params (`since`, `search`) are regex-allowlisted (`^[a-zA-Z0-9 :\\-\\.]+$`), numeric params bounds-checked. Safe.\n- **LDAP injection**: filters use `ldap.EscapeFilter`/`ldap.EscapeDN` (`ldap.go:91,134`). Safe.\n- **Secrets logging**: no password/private-key/secret values are logged; messages only report presence/absence of env vars. OIDC debug logs roles/claims (not tokens) at Debug level.\n- **OIDC**: crypto/rand for state+nonce, PKCE S256, nonce replay check, ID-token verification — all correct (`oidc.go`).\n- **TLS**: TLS 1.2 min, GCM cipher suites only; no `InsecureSkipVerify` anywhere.\n- **Dependencies** (`go.mod`): `golang-jwt/jwt/v5 v5.3.1`, `golang.org/x/crypto v0.52.0`, `coreos/go-oidc/v3 v3.18.0`, `go-ldap/ldap/v3 v3.4.13` — all current, no known severe CVEs.\n\nNet: no SEVERE findings. The three LOW items are deployment-hardening recommendations, with #2 being the most worthwhile (block startup on the publicly-known default JWT keypair)."},{"type":"text","text":"agentId: a9deaff65ff020ceb (use SendMessage with to: 'a9deaff65ff020ceb' to continue this agent)\nsubagent_tokens: 59506\ntool_uses: 26\nduration_ms: 106326"}]}]},"uuid":"50f4499f-6e27-45cc-aba9-1fdf2c8c26b3","timestamp":"2026-06-04T16:43:35.126Z","toolUseResult":{"status":"completed","prompt":"You are a security auditor reviewing the ClusterCockpit cc-backend Go repository at /Users/jan/prg/ClusterCockpit/cc-backend.\n\nScope: Cryptography, secrets handling, configuration, and dependencies.\n\nFocus on:\n- Cryptographic usage: weak algorithms, insecure random (math/rand vs crypto/rand) for security-sensitive values (tokens, salts, session IDs, password reset), JWT key generation/loading, password hashing (what algorithm — bcrypt/argon2? cost factor?). Grep for math/rand, md5, sha1, des, ecb, crypto.\n- Secrets in config: are secrets (JWT private keys, LDAP bind password, NATS password, S3 keys) logged anywhere? Grep for cclog with password/key/secret/token. Any secrets written to disk insecurely or exposed via API/error messages?\n- .env / config loading: insecure defaults, hardcoded credentials, default admin passwords. Check configs/ and cmd/cc-backend.\n- Timing-safe comparison for token/password/HMAC comparisons (subtle.ConstantTimeCompare vs ==).\n- go.mod dependencies: any obviously outdated/vulnerable crypto or auth libraries.\n- Command injection: grep for os/exec, exec.Command with user input.\n\nFind anything SEVERE. For each finding: file:line, severity, concrete exploit scenario, and suggested fix. Verify by reading actual code. Report only real, code-backed findings; if clean, say so briefly.","agentId":"a9deaff65ff020ceb","agentType":"general-purpose","content":[{"type":"text","text":"Keygen uses crypto/rand correctly. I have enough to complete the audit. Let me do a final check on the user-supplied add-user password (no minimum length) and confirm there are no remaining concerns with the rate limiter (per IP+username — username enumeration / lockout bypass).\n\nThe audit is complete. Here are my findings.\n\n## Security Audit: Cryptography, Secrets, Config, Dependencies\n\nOverall the codebase is in good shape. No SEVERE/critical vulnerabilities found in scope. Cryptographic primitives are sound: Ed25519 JWTs, bcrypt password hashing, crypto/rand everywhere security-sensitive, modern TLS config, no weak algorithms (md5/sha1/des/ecb) anywhere, no `math/rand` for tokens/secrets. Dependencies are current. Below are the lower-severity observations worth noting.\n\n### Findings\n\n**1. LOW — Default/example secrets committed in tracked config files**\n- `configs/config.json:29` — NATS `\"username\":\"root\",\"password\":\"root\"`; `:57-67` metric-store tokens `\"MySecret\"`; `:45-46` S3 keys `\"xx\"`.\n- `configs/config-demo.json:19` — a real signed admin+api JWT (`sub:demo, roles:[admin,api]`).\n- These are tracked in git (`git ls-files` confirms), whereas the runtime `config.json` is correctly `.gitignore`d.\n- Verified non-exploitable: the placeholders are obvious dummies, and I decoded the demo JWT — it is signed with the demo key shipped in `configs/env-template.txt` and already expired (exp 2026-04-09). So this is hygiene, not a live leak. Fix: keep these as `.example`/`.template` files and ensure operators never deploy with the shipped `env-template.txt` keys.\n\n**2. LOW — `checkDefaultSecurityKeys()` only warns, doesn't block** — `cmd/cc-backend/main.go:217-224`. Detects the default `JWT_PUBLIC_KEY` and the demo `SESSION_KEY` is similarly only soft-handled. With the default Ed25519 keypair public in the repo, anyone can forge admin JWTs. It only logs a `Warn`. Mitigating factor: `SESSION_KEY` absence is correctly fatal (`auth.go:189-193`). Suggested: also fatal-error (or require an explicit `-dev` opt-in) when the known default JWT keypair is in use, mirroring the SESSION_KEY treatment.\n\n**3. LOW — No password strength/length enforcement for local accounts** — `cmd/cc-backend/main.go:226-244` (`addUser`) and `internal/api/user.go:180`. A local user can be created with an empty or trivial password; bcrypt is applied (`repository/user.go:150`, `bcrypt.DefaultCost`=10, fine) but no minimum policy. Login is rate-limited at 5/15min per IP+username (`auth.go:76`), which mitigates online brute force. Suggested: enforce a minimum length on local-password creation.\n\n### Verified-safe (no action needed)\n- **JWT verification**: `jwt.go:86-92` pins `SigningMethodEdDSA` (no alg-confusion). `jwtCookieSession.go:123,142` uses `WithValidMethods([EdDSA])` and correctly routes keys by issuer (`TrustedIssuer`→cross-login key, `\"\"`→internal key, else reject). `jwtSession.go` HS256/HS512 path uses a separate dedicated `CROSS_LOGIN_JWT_HS512_KEY`, not the Ed25519 key — no HMAC/asymmetric key confusion.\n- **Password compare**: bcrypt's `CompareHashAndPassword` is constant-time (`local.go:41`). No raw `==` comparisons on secrets/tokens anywhere; token equality is delegated to the JWT library's signature verification.\n- **Command injection**: `internal/api/log.go:92` uses `exec.CommandContext(\"journalctl\", args...)` — no shell, admin-role-gated (`:34`), and free-text params (`since`, `search`) are regex-allowlisted (`^[a-zA-Z0-9 :\\-\\.]+$`), numeric params bounds-checked. Safe.\n- **LDAP injection**: filters use `ldap.EscapeFilter`/`ldap.EscapeDN` (`ldap.go:91,134`). Safe.\n- **Secrets logging**: no password/private-key/secret values are logged; messages only report presence/absence of env vars. OIDC debug logs roles/claims (not tokens) at Debug level.\n- **OIDC**: crypto/rand for state+nonce, PKCE S256, nonce replay check, ID-token verification — all correct (`oidc.go`).\n- **TLS**: TLS 1.2 min, GCM cipher suites only; no `InsecureSkipVerify` anywhere.\n- **Dependencies** (`go.mod`): `golang-jwt/jwt/v5 v5.3.1`, `golang.org/x/crypto v0.52.0`, `coreos/go-oidc/v3 v3.18.0`, `go-ldap/ldap/v3 v3.4.13` — all current, no known severe CVEs.\n\nNet: no SEVERE findings. The three LOW items are deployment-hardening recommendations, with #2 being the most worthwhile (block startup on the publicly-known default JWT keypair)."}],"totalDurationMs":106326,"totalTokens":59506,"totalToolUseCount":26,"usage":{"input_tokens":2,"cache_creation_input_tokens":1335,"cache_read_input_tokens":56301,"output_tokens":1868,"server_tool_use":{"web_search_requests":0,"web_fetch_requests":0},"service_tier":"standard","cache_creation":{"ephemeral_1h_input_tokens":0,"ephemeral_5m_input_tokens":1335},"inference_geo":"not_available","iterations":[{"input_tokens":2,"output_tokens":1868,"cache_read_input_tokens":56301,"cache_creation_input_tokens":1335,"cache_creation":{"ephemeral_5m_input_tokens":1335,"ephemeral_1h_input_tokens":0},"type":"message"}],"speed":"standard"},"toolStats":{"readCount":14,"searchCount":0,"bashCount":12,"editFileCount":0,"linesAdded":0,"linesRemoved":0,"otherToolCount":0}},"sourceToolAssistantUUID":"b98aec04-0733-4b4a-8b07-f9c8214e4c14","userType":"external","entrypoint":"cli","cwd":"/Users/jan/prg/ClusterCockpit/cc-backend","sessionId":"135c59e3-1efb-44ab-aebd-4144ab7553b9","version":"2.1.162","gitBranch":"release/v1.5"} {"type":"last-prompt","lastPrompt":"I did a security review with Opus 4.7 . Fixes are already applied. Repeat the audit and check if anything severe was missed in the previous audit","leafUuid":"50f4499f-6e27-45cc-aba9-1fdf2c8c26b3","sessionId":"135c59e3-1efb-44ab-aebd-4144ab7553b9"} {"type":"ai-title","aiTitle":"Repeat security audit after fixes","sessionId":"135c59e3-1efb-44ab-aebd-4144ab7553b9"} {"type":"mode","mode":"normal","sessionId":"135c59e3-1efb-44ab-aebd-4144ab7553b9"} {"type":"permission-mode","permissionMode":"acceptEdits","sessionId":"135c59e3-1efb-44ab-aebd-4144ab7553b9"} {"parentUuid":"0dee2c1f-4588-448b-8842-cbae1cf05783","isSidechain":false,"promptId":"7a77ddc6-2262-4b32-8011-df89cf5077ae","type":"user","message":{"role":"user","content":[{"tool_use_id":"toolu_01MGMz4Nnrb2Xbh47FeVBTMy","type":"tool_result","content":[{"type":"text","text":"These are under `MountAPIRoutes` (the `/api` group), which requires JWT with `RoleAPI` (and admin) — not session cookie, not regular users. So `metaData.message` can only be set by API-key holders (RoleAPI/admin). The `{@html}` rendering is thus a stored-XSS sink reachable only by privileged API users. That's a defense-in-depth concern, not a critical user-to-admin escalation.\n\nI now have everything needed. Let me compile the report.\n\n## Security Audit Report — Web Layer (cc-backend)\n\n### Summary\nThe XSS posture of the server-side templates is **solid**: `web/web.go` uses `html/template` (not `text/template`), and there are **no** `template.HTML`/`template.JS`/`template.URL` wrappers anywhere. All user-controlled values (usernames, filter presets, job IDs, login redirect, error messages) are interpolated via plain `{{ .X }}` in their correct contexts (JS string, HTML attribute, HTML text), so Go's contextual auto-escaping applies. The login `redirect` is also validated server-side to be a relative path (`internal/auth/auth.go:389`), closing the open-redirect. JWTs handed to the frontend are kept in component memory, not `localStorage`/`sessionStorage` (`web/frontend/src/config/.../UserOptions.svelte`, `ShowUsersRow.svelte`) — good.\n\nThe real findings are around **missing CSRF defense-in-depth, missing security headers, and a stored-XSS sink**.\n\n---\n\n### Finding 1 — No CSRF tokens on cookie-authenticated state-changing endpoints (relying solely on SameSite=Lax)\n**Severity: Medium-High**\n**Files:**\n- `internal/api/rest.go:147-160` (`MountConfigAPIRoutes`: `createUser`, `deleteUser`, `updateUser`, `editNotice`, `runTagger` — all session/admin-auth)\n- `internal/api/rest.go:164-171` (`MountFrontendAPIRoutes`: `/frontend/configuration/` POST, `/frontend/jwt/` GET)\n- `cmd/cc-backend/server.go:228` (GraphQL `/query` mutations, session-auth)\n- `internal/auth/auth.go:323-324` (cookie `SameSite=Lax`, `HttpOnly`)\n\n**Analysis:** These endpoints authenticate via session cookie (`AuthViaSession`) with **no CSRF token** (confirmed: the only `csrf` reference in the codebase is the OIDC PKCE comment). The previous audit's `SameSite=Lax` does block classic cross-site **form POST** CSRF, so the POST/PUT/DELETE config endpoints are *mostly* covered by that alone. The concern:\n- `GET /frontend/jwt/?username=` mints a valid JWT and returns it in the body. Under `SameSite=Lax`, a cross-site **top-level GET navigation** *does* send the cookie. An attacker page can't read the response cross-origin (CORS `AllowCredentials:false`), so token theft is blocked — but this shows the reliance on a single control. Any future state-changing GET handler would be exploitable.\n- Defense-in-depth: `SameSite=Lax` is the *only* CSRF control. Browsers/proxies that don't enforce it, or a future endpoint added as GET, would be exposed. For an HPC admin console that can create users and assign the admin role, a proper anti-CSRF token (or `SameSite=Strict` for the session cookie, plus an `Origin`/`Referer` check on state-changing requests) is warranted.\n\n**Fix:** Add an `Origin`/`Sec-Fetch-Site` check (or a synchronizer CSRF token) middleware on all non-GET session-authenticated routes, and consider `SameSite=Strict` for the session cookie. At minimum, ensure no state-changing operation is ever exposed via GET.\n\n---\n\n### Finding 2 — No Content-Security-Policy or other security response headers\n**Severity: Medium**\n**File:** `cmd/cc-backend/server.go:118-144` (middleware chain)\n\nThe middleware sets only `Strict-Transport-Security` (and only when TLS). There is **no** `Content-Security-Policy`, `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`, `X-Frame-Options`/`frame-ancestors`, or `Referrer-Policy` (confirmed: grep for all of these returns nothing). Consequences:\n- No CSP means any XSS (see Finding 3) executes unconstrained, and there's no mitigation for injected inline script.\n- No `X-Frame-Options`/`frame-ancestors 'none'` → the admin UI can be framed for clickjacking.\n- No `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` → MIME-sniffing risk on served content.\n\n**Fix:** Add a middleware setting `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`, `X-Frame-Options: DENY` (or CSP `frame-ancestors 'none'`), `Referrer-Policy: same-origin`, and a CSP. Note the templates use inline `