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Fix critical issues from follow-up security audit

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A second-pass audit surfaced three severe issues missed by the previous
review, each a sibling code path of a bug class that was only partially
fixed before:

- auth: JWT session login (jwtSession.go) registered its authenticator
  even when CROSS_LOGIN_JWT_HS512_KEY was unset, leaving an empty HMAC
  key. golang-jwt verifies any HS256/HS512 signature against an empty
  key, allowing unauthenticated admin token forgery. Init() now refuses
  to register without a key, with a defense-in-depth empty-key guard in
  the keyfunc.

- repository: metric names from GraphQL ([String!]) were interpolated
  raw into json_extract(footprint, "$.<name>") SQL. SQLite parses
  double-quoted strings as literals, enabling SQL injection by any
  authenticated user. Validate metric names against ^[a-zA-Z0-9_]+$ in
  jobsMetricStatisticsHistogram and buildFloatJSONCondition.

- metricstore: cluster/host line-protocol tags flowed unvalidated into
  path.Join(RootDir, cluster, host) for checkpoint/WAL files, allowing
  arbitrary file write outside the checkpoint root via NATS
  (unauthenticated) or POST /api/write. Reject path-traversal sequences
  in DecodeLine before the tags become path components.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Entire-Checkpoint: b57246993ec1
This commit is contained in:
Jan Eitzinger
2026-06-04 19:07:20 +02:00
parent 6f7e262f3f
commit 6d86690c76
4 changed files with 58 additions and 7 deletions
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26
internal/auth/jwtSession.go
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@@ -25,15 +25,21 @@ type JWTSessionAuthenticator struct {
var _ Authenticator = (*JWTSessionAuthenticator)(nil)
func (ja *JWTSessionAuthenticator) Init() error {
if pubKey := os.Getenv("CROSS_LOGIN_JWT_HS512_KEY"); pubKey != "" {
bytes, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(pubKey)
if err != nil {
cclog.Warn("Could not decode cross login JWT HS512 key")
return err
}
ja.loginTokenKey = bytes
pubKey := os.Getenv("CROSS_LOGIN_JWT_HS512_KEY")
if pubKey == "" {
// Without a configured key the HMAC verification below would run against
// an empty key, which lets anyone forge a valid token. Refuse to register
// the authenticator in that case so JWT session login is simply disabled.
return errors.New("CROSS_LOGIN_JWT_HS512_KEY not set: JWT session login disabled")
}
bytes, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(pubKey)
if err != nil {
cclog.Warn("Could not decode cross login JWT HS512 key")
return err
}
ja.loginTokenKey = bytes
cclog.Info("JWT Session authenticator successfully registered")
return nil
}
@@ -60,6 +66,12 @@ func (ja *JWTSessionAuthenticator) Login(
token, err := jwt.Parse(rawtoken, func(t *jwt.Token) (any, error) {
if t.Method == jwt.SigningMethodHS256 || t.Method == jwt.SigningMethodHS512 {
// Defense in depth: an empty key would verify any HMAC signature.
// Init() already refuses to register without a key, so this should
// never trigger, but guard explicitly rather than trust the chain.
if len(ja.loginTokenKey) == 0 {
return nil, errors.New("HS login key not configured")
}
return ja.loginTokenKey, nil
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unkown signing method for login token: %s (known: HS256, HS512, EdDSA)", t.Method.Alg())